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 At the core of rights in the United States is the right to vote, and 
while this right has long been held to be fundamental it is not equal 
among all U.S. Citizens.1 The right to vote is not granted to some U.S. 
Citizens depending upon what U.S. territory they reside in. This 
distinction is based on the definition of United States in the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), which 
arbitrarily includes some U.S. territories while excluding others. 
In Segovia v. United States, the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
exclusion of former Illinois citizens residing in U.S. territories from 
voting in federal elections. In Segovia, the court held that U.S. citizens 
residing in U.S. territories do not have a fundamental right to vote in 
federal elections.2 Here, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) and the Illinois Military Overseas 
                                                 
 * J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; M.S., May 2017, Criminal Justice Administration, Mercyhurst 
University; B.A., May 2015, Political Science, University of Mount Union. Thank 
you to my family and friends who have always supported me, the University of 
Mount Union wrestling team, Jack Locke, and my professors who have helped guide 
me along the way. 
 1 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). 
2 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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Voter Empowerment Act ("Illinois MOVE”) did not equally protect 
voting rights for six former Illinois residents. This decision led to the 
disenfranchisement of former military members, and further limited 
the right to vote for citizens living in U.S. territories like Puerto Rico.3 
In doing so the court used a rational basis analysis to uphold an 
underinclusive distinction between citizens of similarly situated U.S. 
territories that did not allow the Plaintiffs to receive absentee ballots. 
This comment discusses the issues in Segovia and how the 
Plaintiffs could have established that they had a fundamental right to 
vote.4 The article first discusses voting throughout American history 
and how it has expanded since over time. The discussion then focuses 
on determining state citizenship, and how it relates to the right to vote. 
Lastly, the comment focuses on how the Plaintiffs could have 
established their right to vote as fundamental by arguing that they 
were Illinois citizens.  
 
History of the Right to Vote: Fundamental Voting Rights, 
Strict Scrutiny, and Absentee Ballots 
 
 Voting has long been a fundamental right in America.5 A U.S. 
citizen must also be a citizen of a state in order to have a fundamental 
right to vote.6 The Framers created a government where voting is a 
vital aspect of the system, and the Supreme Court has a long held that 
the right to vote is fundamental.7 The fundamental aspect of voting is 
inherent in the way the Framers formed the government.8 James 
Madison stated that “[t]he right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). 
6 See U.S. Const amend. 14. 
7 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). 
8 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
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Republican Constitutions.”9 And without the right to vote other 
fundamental rights we hold dear are “illusory” because “the right to 
vote freely [ . . . is] the essence of a democratic society, and any 
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative 
government.”10 Therefore, every person is granted one equal vote 
“without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence 
within a State.”11 
 
A. Expansion Through Legislation and Amendments 
 
 The right to vote was not as thoroughly protected as it is today. In 
the past, the right to vote worked as a privilege bestowed upon the 
upper-class rather than a right belonging to the many. Accordingly, 
throughout United States history there has been a continuous 
expansion of the scope of the right to vote.12 For instance, initially the 
right to vote was limited to white property owners and based on a tax 
payment requirement.13 But over time, the several states, Congress, 
and the Supreme Court have consistently sought to prevent the 
narrowing of the right the right to vote.14 As a result, we have seen the 
vast expansion of the scope of the right to vote over the past three 
centuries.15 The first step in the expansion of voting rights was the 
                                                 
 9 Yazmin Dawood, Symposium: The Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze: 
The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and The Problem of Wealth, 67 MD. 
L. REV. 123, 131 (2007). 
10 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 555 n.28 (explaining “The Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
third and Twenty-fourth Amendments to the Federal Constitution all involve 
expansions of the right of suffrage. Also relevant, in this regard, is the civil rights 
legislation enacted by Congress in 1957 and 1960.”). 
 13 Richard Briffault, Review: The Contested Right to Vote, MICH. L. REV. 100, 
No. 6, 1506, 1509-1511 (2002). 
14 Id. at 1508-1509. 
15 Id. at 1508.  
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abolition of laws that limited voting to property owners.16 This process 
was accomplished by each state individually eliminating property 
ownership requirements.17  
 Likewise, the U.S. Congress has consistently expanded voting 
rights.18 Passing constitutional amendments in America is a difficult 
process because “[a] proposed amendment must be passed by two-
thirds of both houses of Congress, then ratified by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the states.”19 Consequently, when an amendment is 
passed it reflects a consensus view of the importance of the 
enumerated right. And the United States has seven amendments that 
concern the right to vote, illustrating that the right is uniformly valued 
across the nation.20 
 In 1868, this nation uniformly demonstrated the value of voting 
rights by passing the Fifteenth Amendment which states that “the right 
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”21 Congress again expanded the right 
to vote by passing the Nineteenth Amendment which states that “[t]he 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”22 
The U.S. again expanded the right to vote in 1971 by passing the 26th 
Amendment which lowered the legal voting age from 21 to 18.23 
 Additionally, Congress has passed an abundance of legislation 
protecting the right to vote.24 Much of this legislation is meant to 
                                                 
 16 Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, The Evolution of Suffrage 
Institutions in the New World, 65 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, 891, 900 
(2005). 
17 Stanley L. Engerman Et Al., supra, note 16. 
18 Stanley L. Engerman Et Al., supra, note 16. 
19 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, AND XXVII. 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
24 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
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prevent the infringement of the amendments illustrated in the 
Constitution.25 For example, Congress ratified the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 by preventing states from enacting discriminatory voting 
legislation.26 Congress has not simply protected the right to vote but 
has also made voting as easily accessible as possible. For example, the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 allows voters to register to 
vote when receiving and renewing their driver’s license.27 Similarly, 
Congress intended the UOCAVA to protect the right to vote for 
citizens living abroad.28  
 
B.  Voting and Court Decisions  
 
 The Supreme Court has also stringently protected the right to 
vote, recognizing that the right to vote is precious to the American 
legal system and society.29 The Court consistently holds that the right 
to vote is fundamental and that any infringement is subject to strict 
scrutiny.30 The Court has adopted the Framers view that voting was to 
be a central aspect of the United States. After all, “no right is more 
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in [an] election,” 
and “other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote 
is undermined.”31 The United States Constitution does not permit any 
“classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this 
right.”32 And the Supreme Court has consistently held that “any 
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.”33  This is especially true with regards to 
Equal Protection claims, as the Court has held that “because of the 
                                                 
25 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
26 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
27 Nat’l Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S. Code § 20501 et. seq. (1993). 
28 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 2018). 
29 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
30 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
31 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
32 Id.  
33 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966). 
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overriding importance of voting rights, classifications which might 
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully 
confined where those rights are asserted under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”34 Therefore, a court should subject any infringement of a 
fundamental right to vote to strict scrutiny.  
 However, the right to vote is not fundamental for all U.S. citizens, 
and a significant deviation from the strict scrutiny analysis occurs in 
voting cases when claims are brought by U.S. citizens who are not 
citizens of a state. For instance, in Igartúa v. U.S, citizens of Puerto 
Rico sought the right to vote in the House of Representatives to 
establish a Puerto Rican Congressman.35 Even though citizens of 
Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens, the court held that they do not have a 
fundamental right to vote “since Puerto Rico is not a state and cannot 
be treated as a state under the Constitution.”36 In effect, the right to 
vote is only fundamental for U.S. citizens who are also citizens of a 
state.37 
 The Second Circuit also examined a variation of this issue.38 In 
Romeu v. Cohen, a plaintiff alleged that New York’s enforcement of 
the UOCAVA violated the Equal Protection Clause when the state 
refused to send him an absentee ballot in Puerto Rico.39  In Romeu, the 
plaintiff, a former citizen of New York, felt that U.S. citizens living in 
U.S. territories were not receiving the equal protection of their voting 
rights compared to U.S. citizens living overseas.40 The court held that 
                                                 
 34 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (citing 
Harpe r, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)). 
35 Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 36 Id.; see also, Jones Act, Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 
951 (1917) (In the Jones Act of 1917 Congress granted U.S. citizenship to those 
living and born in Puerto Rico).  
 37 See also U.S. Const. amend. 23 (stating that “For purposes of representation 
in the Congress, election of the President and Vice President, and article V of this 
Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government of the United States 
shall be treated as though it were a State.”)  
38 Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). 
39 Id. at 125. 
40 Id. 
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there was not an equal protection violation, but rather it was simply 
part of the cost of a person moving their permanent residence outside 
of a state.41  
 Notably, the mere failure to receive an absentee ballot is not 
subject to strict scrutiny because the right to receive absentee ballots is 
not fundamental, the right to vote is.42 For instance, in McDonald v. 
Board of Election Comm’rs., the Court analyzed the constitutionality 
of a statute that did not send inmates awaiting trial absentee ballots.43 
The Court however decided not to use a heightened scrutiny analysis 
because the petitioner did not allege an infringement of the right to 
vote, but rather alleged an infringement of right to receive absentee 
ballots. The Court held that the there was nothing in the record 
alleging that the “Illinois statutory scheme ha[d] an impact on 
appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote. It is thus 
not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive 
absentee ballots.”44 The Court reasoned that it was possible the state 
would allow the inmates to vote through other means.45 As a result, the 
Court did not consider the issue as a violation of the fundamental right 
to vote and used a rational basis analysis.46 
 Since McDonald, the Court has dealt with a similar issue twice.47 
However, the McDonald decision simply evolved into a requirement 
that the infringed party allege that their failure to receive absentee 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
43 Id. at 806. 
44 Id. 
 45 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808 n.6 (1969). (“the 
record is barren of any indication that the State might not, for instance, possibly 
furnish the jails with special polling booths or facilities on election day, or provide 
guarded transportation to the polls themselves for certain inmates, or entertain 
motions for temporary reductions in bail to allow some inmates to get to the polls on 
their own.”)  
46 Id. 
 47 See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 
(1973) 
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ballots actually infringes on their right to vote.48 For example, in 
Goosby v. Osser the Court used a strict scrutiny test to consider the 
constitutionality of a statute that refused to supply prisoners awaiting 
trial with absentee ballots.49 The Court chose to use a strict scrutiny 
analysis because the petitioners stated that their requests to register 
and vote by other means were denied.50  In O'Brien v. Skinner, the 
Court again used a strict scrutiny analysis to deal with New York’s 
refusal to supply certain inmates awaiting trial absentee ballots.51 The 
statute did not specifically deal with inmates but rather stated that 
individuals could only vote via absentee ballot if they were 
“unavoidably absent” from their county of residence.52 Consequently, 
those held in jail awaiting trial in a county other than their residence” 
were able to vote by absentee ballot, but “persons confined for the 
same reason in the county of their residence [were] completely denied 
the ballot.”53 This violated the well settled principal that "if a 
challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies 
the franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether the 
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.'"54 
Consequently, the O’Brien Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis 
when holding that the New York statue unconstitutionally infringed 
upon the right to vote.55  
 
                                                 
48 McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808. 
49 Goosby, 409 U.S. at 513. 
50 Id. at 522 (“Requests by members of petitioners' class to register and to vote 
either by absentee ballot, or by personal or proxy appearance at polling places 
outside the prison, or at polling booths and registration facilities set up at the prisons, 
or generally by any means satisfactory to the election officials, had been denied.”).  
51 O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 528-29. 
52 Id. (citing N. Y. Election Law § 117 (1)(b) 1964). 
53 Id.  
 54 O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 530 (1974) (Marshall. J., concurring).  
55Id. 
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Federalism & the Right to Vote: Domicile versus Residence  
 
 An individual residing in a U.S. territory may not have a 
fundamental right to vote because a U.S. citizen’s relationship to a 
state may present a constitutional difference of whether the right is 
fundamental.56 As stated, the right to vote in federal elections is not 
fundamental for all U.S. Citizens.57 The fundamental aspect of the 
right to vote is reserved for U.S. citizens who are citizens of a State, 
even if they reside in a U.S. territory. After all, the definition of 
‘reside’ in the Citizenship Clause aligns with the definition of 
domicile, and that is the context in which courts use it.58 For this 
reason, if an individual is domiciled in a state they are a citizen of that 
state and their right to vote is fundamental. 
 This is inherent in the U.S. federalist system that reserves rights 
to the states and the federal government; a system that protects 
individuals’ fundamental rights against both State and Federal 
conduct.59 This assertion is plainly supported by the U.S. 
Constitution.60 The Federalist system was designed to place power in 
the hands of the people in each state.61 The Tenth Amendment states 
that the powers not given to the federal government “are reserved to 
the states respectively, or to the people.”62 And the Declaration of 
Independence states that the power to govern derives from the people 
giving their “consent to be governed.”63 The predominate way that 
people give this consent is by voting, and the Constitution clearly 
places this right in the hands of State citizens as well as U.S. citizens.64 
In fact, the only jurisdiction that is permitted to vote in federal 
                                                 
56 See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010). 
57 Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010). 
58 See e.g., Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 649 (1878). 
59 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVII. 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
62 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
63 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1 stat. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, and XXI. 
9
Roby: I Might Stay Awhile: The Fundamental Right to Vote in a Residency
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018




elections that is not a state is Washington D.C., and even this required 
the ratification of the Twenty-Third Amendment.65 Above all, the right 
to vote was a state matter, before it was an aspect of national 
citizenship.66 
 The fundamental nature of the right to vote for citizens of a state 
is inherent in the U.S. Constitution, by allowing the people of each 
state to vote for their own representatives.67 Article One of the U.S. 
Constitution states that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen . . . by the People of the several 
States.”68  And the Seventeenth Amendment further placed the right to 
vote in the hands of State citizens by giving them the right to vote for 
U.S. Senators opposed to electors.69  Thus, pursuant to the 
Constitution  the right to vote is fundamental for U.S. Citizens and 
State Citizens. 
 Yet, determining State citizenship is a more complex matter than 
expected. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause states that 
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens 
of . . . the State wherein they reside.”70 This text seems to assert that 
State citizenship is granted based an individual’s residency, but that is 
not the case. Within the judicial system the terms “domicile,” 
“resident,” and “citizen” have become so intertwined that their 
meaning within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment is difficult 
to ascertain.71 This is due to several factors, but generally the term 
reside refers to domicile as opposed to residence.  
 Firstly, the common definition of “reside” either explicitly refers 
to domicile or coincides with its definition. For instance Webster’s 
Dictionary defines reside as, “to dwell permanently or continuously[, 
                                                 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. 23. 
66 Briffault, supra, note 13 at 1511.  
67 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, Cl 1. 
68 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, Cl 1. 
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1870). 
71 See O.R. Clark, Elections: Student Voting, CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY, 
Volume II, 223, 228 (1917). 
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or] occupy a place as one's legal domicile.”72 The legal definitions of 
these terms similarly relate residence with the definition of domicile.73 
Black’s Law Dictionary does not define reside but rather distinguishes 
the terms “residence” and “legal residence.”74 In Black’s Law 
Dictionary the term residence coincides with the common definition in 
Webster’s Dictionary.75 At any rate the definition of “legal residence” 
directs the reader to “domicile,” which Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines as “a person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home [. . . 
or] the residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes.”76 
Accordingly, within the legal context the term reside refers to 
domicile. 
 Even more, the meaning of reside is so convoluted because courts 
often use the terms “residence” and “domicile” interchangeably.77 
“Residence may or may not demonstrate citizenship, which depends 
on domicile.”78 But above all “the underlying distinction between the 
concepts of domicile and residence remains: while a person may have 
only one domicile, he or she may have more than one residence.”79  
 Within the context of the Citizenship Clause, courts may use the 
terms interchangeably, but both terms use and meaning are consistent 
                                                 
 72 “reside”. (2018). In: Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. [online] Available 
at: http://www.merriam-webster.com [Accessed 12 Nov. 2018]. 
 73 See Domicile, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 74 See Residence; & Legal Residence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 75 Residence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defines residence as 
“The act or fact of living in a given place for some time”); “Residence”. (2018). In: 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. [online] Available at: http://www.merriam-
webster.com [Accessed 12 Nov. 2018] (defined as “the act or fact of dwelling in a 
place for some time[, or] the act or fact of living or regularly staying at or in some 
place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a benefit”). 
76 Domicile, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
77 See e.g., Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 649 (1878); Gavin J. Dow, Mr. 
Emanuel Returns From Washington: Durational Residence Requirements and 
Election Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2013). 
 78 Heinen v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 671 F.3d 669, 670 (7th Cir. 2012); see 
also id. 
79 Grange Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 494 Mich. 475, 527 (2013). 
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with the definition of domicile.80 This has been the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation since it decided a diversity jurisdiction issue in 
Robertson v. Cease just a decade after the ratification of the 
Citizenship Clause.81 In Robertson, the Court, for the first time since 
the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment dealt with determining State 
citizenship for diversity jurisdiction.82 The Court held that there was 
nothing in the “language or policy” of the Citizenship Clause that 
conferred jurisdiction based on mere residence in a state.83 And the 
Court stated that a Defendant’s residence was “insufficient to show his 
citizenship in [a] State.”84 This is because residence alone cannot 
confer that an individual had a fixed “permanent domicile in that 
state.”85  
 When dealing with diversity issues courts look to domicile 
instead of residence because domicile is akin to citizenship.86 The 
main reason for this distinction is that residence can be temporary, and 
domicile is a fixed location. Generally, domicile can “only be changed 
through a person‘s intention to acquire a new domicile, a person never 
intending to make a permanent home elsewhere never loses his or her 
original domicile, in spite of absence from a jurisdiction that can 
stretch for years at a time.”87 Courts a analyze several factors when 
determining domicile, such as: intent of an individual to return or 
remain, property owned in the state, voting practices, and tax 
records.88And the Supreme Court has frowned on the use of residence 
                                                 
80 Id.  




85 Id.  
86 E.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914). 
87 Gavin J. Dow, Mr. Emanuel Returns From Washington: Durational 
Residence Requirements and Election Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1515, 1518 
(2013). 
88 Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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alone because it makes it easier to manipulate jurisdiction.89 For 
example, in Morris v. Gilmer a creditor changed his residence to 
Tennessee in order to obtain diversity jurisdiction.90 The Court held 
that “a citizen of the United States can instantly transfer his citizenship 
from one State to another, and that his right to sue in the courts of the 
United States is none the less because his change of domicil[e] was 
induced by the purpose.”91 However, the Court also held that for the 
change in domicile to “constitute a change of citizenship” the change 
in residence had to be accompanied with the intention to make it a 
permanent residence.92 As a result, the Court did not grant jurisdiction 
as the creditor “had no purpose to acquire a domicil[e] or settled home 
in Tennessee.”93 
 Domicile allows individuals who move around or have multiple 
residences to decide their  own citizenship. In Carrington v. Rash, the 
Court struck down a statute that did not permit servicemen to vote in 
Texas if they were not domiciled there before enlisting.94 The Court 
stated that Texas would only be permitted to implement reasonable 
policies for “determining whether servicemen have actually acquired a 
new domicile in a State for franchise purposes.”95 Similarly, in Saenz 
v. Roe the Court struck down a minimum residency requirement to 
vote.96 The Court held that the Citizenship Clause allows people to 
choose to be citizens of a state, not for states to choose its citizens.97 
And the Seventh Circuit has also supported this key aspect of 
domicile.98   
 
                                                 
89 Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 329 (1889). 
90 Id. at 329. 
91 Id. at 328. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 329.  
94 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965).  
95 Id. at 96. 
96 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999). 
97 Id. at 511. 
98 See Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991). 
13
Roby: I Might Stay Awhile: The Fundamental Right to Vote in a Residency
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018




Segovia: Standing Issue  
 
 In deciding Segovia, the Seventh Circuit considered three issues. 
The first issue was whether the Plaintiffs, six former residents of 
Illinois, had standing to bring their equal protection claim against the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
(“UOCAVA”).99 The Court recognized that the UOCAVA was 
enacted by Congress to “protect the voting rights of United States 
citizens who move overseas but retain their American citizenship.”100 
The Act reserves the right of these citizens to receive absentee ballots 
to vote in “general, special, primary, and runoff elections for Federal 
office.”101 Under UOCAVA a U.S. citizen is permitted to receive an 
absentee ballot from the last state they were domiciled, and they do 
not need to have any intention to return to that state.102 The Seventh 
Circuit held that the Plaintiffs, do not have standing because their 
injury is not “fairly traceable” to the government’s enforcement under 
the UOCAVA.103  
 There are two aspects of standing.104 First, to confer federal 
jurisdiction in relation to Article III of the U.S. Constitution the 
Plaintiff must allege an injury that would be remedied by the court 
ruling in their favor.105 Second, the court must determine whether the 
plaintiff’s injury is “fairly traceable” to “the challenged conduct.”106 
The Plaintiff will not have standing if the injury “results from the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”107 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 52 U.S.C.S. § 20301(b)(3) (2011). 
102 52 U.S.C.S. § 20301(b)(3) (2011). 
 103 Id. at 388-389; see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013). 
104 Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2018). 
105 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499 (1975). 
106 Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. 693 at 700. 
107 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). 
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Traceability does not need to be direct, but rather must have a causal 
showing.108   
 In Segovia, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court 
and held that the Plaintiff’s injury was not traceable to the 
governments enforcement UOCAVA.109 This decision was based on 
the definition of “United States” in the UOCAVA.110 The UOCAVA 
defines United States as “the States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and 
American Samoa."111 The court held that the UOCAVA does not 
prohibit Illinois from providing residents of Puerto Rico, Guam, and 
the virgin islands absentee ballots, but rather the Illinois statute does 
that unilaterally.112  
 However, the court’s opinion lacks an in-depth discussion of 
traceability. The court analogizes the standing issue in Segovia with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org.113 But the facts presented in Simon present constitutionally 
different causality issues.114 In Simon the Court held that the injury-in-
fact was not fairly traceable to the government enforcement of an IRS 
ruling.115 The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted from an IRS rule 
that offered hospitals a tax incentive for giving indigent patients 
limited services.116 The Supreme Court held that there was no standing 
because there was a lack of a causal relationship.117 The Court 
expressed that whether a hospital denied indigent patients could stem 
from a number of factors that did not include the tax incentive.118 As a 
                                                 
108 Id. at 44. 
109 Segovia, 880 F.3d at 387. 
110 Id.  
111 52 U.S.C. § 20310(8) (2011). 
112 Id.  
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result, “there was [not] substantial likelihood that victory in th[e] suit 
would result in respondents' receiving the hospital treatment they 
desire[d].”119  
 But, the Seventh Circuit’s use of Simon was in error because the 
facts and issues presented in relation to standing were slightly outside 
the scope of those in Segovia.120 The court attempted to compare the 
third-party decision of local hospitals to Illinois refusing to send 
absentee ballots to non-resident citizens.121 This analysis is improper 
for several reasons. First, in Simon, part of the reason the Court held 
there was no causal connection was because a hospital could make the 
decision to turn away indigent patients absent any consideration of the 
tax incentive.122 Unlike the scenario in Simon, the decision not to send 
absentee ballots to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico directly stems 
from the government’s enforcement of the UOCAVA, as the Illinois 
statute must correspond to the federal one.123 Also, there are over 
5,000 hospitals in this country, and the causal aspect of the individual 
decisions of each hospital is much more attenuated than the decision 
of Illinois to enact Illinois Military Overseas Voter Empowerment Act 
("Illinois MOVE").124 Second, unlike in Simon if the Plaintiffs in 
Segovia won their claim they would have an immediate remedy to 
their issue.125   
 Further, not allowing standing under the UOCAVA is 
inconsistent with the doctrine of expressio unius, which asserts that 
omissions should be understood as exclusions.126 It is not always the 
                                                 
119 Id. 
 120 See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2018); see also id. 
 121 Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389; see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 39. 
122 Simon, 426 U.S. at 44. 
123 See Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 218 F. Supp. 3d 643, 646 
(N.D. Ill. 2016). 
 124 Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, 2018, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATIONS 
(February, 2018), available at https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals. 
125 Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389. 
126 See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 157 (2003). 
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case that omissions are exclusions, but that is the case here.127 The 
UOCAVA does not mention equivalent U.S. territories such as the 
Northern Mariana islands in the definition of the United States, and as 
a result they have been permitted to receive absentee ballots.128 The 
UOCAVA not mentioning these similarly situated territories has 
resulted in certain U.S. Citizens arbitrarily not being protected by the 
UOCAVA.129 The result is that the UOCAVA does not provide non-
resident U.S. citizens equal protection of their voting rights depending 
on the territory they reside in. Consequently, the UOCAVA confers 
standing because if there were changes to the UOCAVA the Plaintiffs 
injury would be remedied.130  
 In consideration of the above-mentioned issues, the causal 
connection between the injury and the UOCAVA is enough to confer 
standing. Non-resident U.S. Citizens are unable to vote in federal 
elections because the governments enforcement of the UOCAVA 
allows Illinois to refuse them absentee ballots.131 The District Court 
was correct that “Illinois is bound by the floor that the federal 
defendants stress that the UOCAVA provides.”132 And that if the 
UOCAVA excluded “Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands” 
Illinois would be required to provide the Plaintiffs with absentee 
ballots, or if the UOCAVA specifically addressed American territories 
the Plaintiff’s would be able to obtain absentee ballots.133 Therefore, 
the Plaintiffs injuries are indeed traceable to the UOCAVA. 
 
                                                 
 127 See Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 945 n.6 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
128 52 U.S.C.S. § 20301(b)(3) (2011). 
129 See 52 U.S.C. § 20310(8) (2011). 
130 See Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 218 F. Supp. 3d 643, 646 
(N.D. Ill. 2016). 
131 Id. 
132 Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 201 F. Supp. 3d 924, 937 
(N.D. Ill. 2016) 
133 Id. 
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The Plaintiffs Should Have Argued that their Domicile is Illinois 
So Their Right to Vote Would Be Fundamental  
 
 The second issue decided by the Seventh Circuit in Segovia 
involved the narrowing of the fundamental right to vote.134 The court 
held that the right to vote is not fundamental for non-resident U.S. 
citizens.135 As a result, the court used a rational basis test instead of a 
strict scrutiny analysis.136 The Seventh Circuit is correct that non-
resident U.S. citizens do not have a fundamental right to vote because 
that right is reserved to citizens of a state. However, whether that right 
is fundamental depends on whether the individual is also a citizen of a 
State. So, if the Plaintiffs were able to establish that they were 
domiciled in Illinois they would have a fundamental right to vote, and 
the Courts decision of standing would have been of little consequence.  
Here the plaintiffs were “six United States citizens who are 
former residents of Illinois and who now reside in Puerto Rico, Guam, 
or the U.S. Virgin Islands, plus two organizations that promote voting 
rights in United States Territories.”137 The individuals were also 
former military servicemembers.138 The Plaintiffs contended that their 
denial of absentee ballots is a due process violation of Equal 
Protection under the UOCAVA and Illinois Move Statute.139 The Due 
Process Clause protects life, liberty, and property.140 “Liberty . . . 
extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to 
pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental 
objective.”141 State legislation violates Equal Protection when “the 
rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature.”142 
                                                 
134 Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Segovia, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 652. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 339. 
140 U.S. Const. Amend. 14. 
141 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954). 
142 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). 
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Equal protection claims only require a strict scrutiny analysis when the 
legislation in question “impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right."143 Under a strict scrutiny analysis a law which 
infringes upon a fundamental right “is permissible only if it is 
narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest."144  
 The UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE affect a fundamental right, but 
not in the manner the Plaintiffs alleged.145 The Plaintiffs were not 
receiving the same protection of voting rights as those similarly 
situated in territories like the Northern Mariana Islands.146 Illinois 
citizens have a fundamental right to vote regardless of their current 
residence.147 It is within the plain meaning of the Fifteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendment that “the right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State.”148 These amendments expressly specify the right in relation 
Federal and State conduct. At the time of enacting these amendments 
Congress did not consider the right to vote in respect to U.S. 
territories, but rather just in regard to U.S. State citizens. And the right 
to vote in federal elections is enumerated in the constitution relating to 
States.149 For instance, the President of the United States is elected by 
the electors from the several States, not U.S. Territories.150 Even more, 
Senators and members of the House of Representatives are both voted 
upon “by the People of the several States.”151 “Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution alone “uses the term ‘State’ or ‘States’ eight times when 
defining and outlining the House of Representatives.”152 The right to 
vote for citizens of U.S. territories cannot be read into any of these 
                                                 
143 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). 
144 Id. 
145 Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). 
146 Id. 
147 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 
148 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. 
149 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, Cl 2. 
150 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, Cl 2. 
151 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. 17. 
152 Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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constitutional provisions or amendments, as they specifically place 
limits upon the federal government and the states. Thus, if this right 
was further reserved to citizens in U.S. territories it would have to be 
stated within the U.S. Constitution.  
 The Seventh Circuit held that although the right to vote is 
fundamental that right is not fundamental for U.S. citizens who are 
currently residing in U.S. territories.153 The court cited one case to 
support its assertion.154 That case was a First Circuit case which is part 
of a long line of cases that have consistently held that Puerto Rican 
citizens and residents could not vote in federal elections because they 
do not have a fundamental right to vote.155 In Igartúa I, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the UOCAVA did not equally protect the right to vote for 
Puerto Rican residents because those who formally resided in a state 
were given the right to vote in federal elections while other Puerto 
Rican citizens were not.156 The First Circuit used a rational basis test 
in this case because Puerto Rican citizens do not have a fundamental 
right to vote.157 Through this series of cases the plaintiffs sought the 
right to vote in federal elections based on a number of different 
arguments, but the conclusion is always the same.158 Each Igartúa 
court basis its decision on two keys reasons; (1) Puerto Rican citizens 
do not have a fundamental right to vote, and (2) the right to vote in 
federal elections is reserved to states and Puerto Rico cannot be 
                                                 
153 Id. 
 154 See Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389; see also Igartúa v. U.S., 626 F.3d 592, 595 
(1st Cir. 2010). 
 155 Id.; see also Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Igartua-de la Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa IV); Igartua-de 
la Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa III); De La Rosa v. U.S., 229 
F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (Igartúa II); Igartúa de la Rosa v. U.S., 32 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 
1994) (Igartúa I) (Igartúa is a series of cases in which individuals brought several 
claims and arguments attempting to establish their right to vote in Presidential 
Elections and for a member of the House of Representatives as Puerto Rican 
citizens). 
156 Igartúa de la Rosa v. U.S., 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994). 
157 Id. at 83. 
158 See e.g., id. at 85. 
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considered a state under the U.S. Constitution.159  But, these cases 
differ from the facts in Segovia for multiple reasons.  
 First, Puerto Rican citizens were attempting to establish their own 
representatives in congress, and the right to vote for the President of 
the United states, which is a right reserved only to states.160 The First 
Circuit stated that “since Puerto Rico is not a state, and cannot be 
treated as a state under the Constitution . . . its citizens do not have a 
constitutional right to vote for members of the House of 
Representatives.”161 This presented a constitutionally different 
question than the one presented by the Plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs were 
exercising their right to vote as former Illinois residents, not citizens of 
Puerto Rico.162 Second, in Igartúa I, the court plainly stated that 
former state residents residing in Puerto Rico have the right vote in 
federal elections.163 
 The issue in Segovia more closely aligns with the above-
mentioned case of Romeu because like in Segovia, the plaintiff in 
Romeu claimed that as former state citizen the UOCAVA did not 
equally protection his right to vote.164 “Romeu [could not] vote for the 
President [of the United States] in Puerto Rico because the existing 
laws do not confer such a voting right on U.S. citizens domiciled in 
Puerto Rico.”165 Yet, the Segovia court’s only mention of Romeu is a 
                                                 
 159 See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010); Igartua-de 
la Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa IV); Igartua-de la Rosa v. 
U.S., 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa III); De La Rosa v. U.S., 229 F.3d 80 (1st 




162 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 163 “[T]he Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act [ . . . ] 
provides that United States citizens, including residents of Puerto Rico, who reside 
outside the United States retain the right to vote via absentee ballot in their last place 
of residence in the United States.” De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st 
Cir. 1994).  
164 Id.; see also Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). 
165 Romeu, 265 F.3d at 126. 
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quote stating that granting the Plaintiffs voting rights under the 
UOCAVA “would have created a distinction of questionable fairness 
among Puerto Rican U.S. citizens, some of whom would be able to 
vote for President and others not, depending whether they had 
previously resided in a State.”166 But this fairness is embedded in the 
system created by the U.S. Constitution. It may not be fair that states 
have significantly greater rights than U.S. territories, but that is the 
system created by the U.S. Constitution. 
 In turn, if the Plaintiffs in Segovia could have established that 
they had a fundamental right to vote by presenting a constitutionally 
different issue, that the UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE statute did not 
equally protect the right to vote for Illinois citizens. The Plaintiffs 
being former Illinois residents, while significant, did not award them a 
fundamental right to vote. However, the Plaintiffs should have placed 
stock in their former residency in Illinois and argued that although 
they reside in Puerto Rico they consider Illinois their domicile, and are 
therefore Illinois citizens. “[S]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution the mere allegation of 
residence in Illinois did not make such a prima facie case of 
citizenship in that State.”167 The Segovia Court bases nearly its entire 
decision on the fact that non-resident U.S. citizens do not have a 
fundamental right to vote.168 But if the Plaintiffs could have 
established that their domicile was Illinois it would negate the fact that 
residents of U.S. territories do not have a fundamental right to vote.  
Along those lines, the Seventh Circuit has proved to be quite 
lenient when considering whether an individual has an actual domicile 
in a state. Take for example Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden.169 In 
Galva, the Defendant, Heiden, alleged there was no diversity 
jurisdiction because he and the Plaintiff were both citizens of Illinois. 
But Heiden also had significant ties to Florida.170 “Heiden had 
                                                 
166 Id. at 125. 
 167 Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1878). 
168 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 2018). 
169 Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991). 
170 Id. 
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registered to vote in Florida, had taken out a Florida driver's license, 
had stated in an application for a Florida tax exemption that he had 
become [. . .] a permanent resident of Florida, and had listed his 
Florida address as his permanent address on both his federal and 
Illinois income tax returns.”171 However, while Heiden split time 
between Illinois and Florida he only took these actions to shield 
himself from Illinois tax law.172 In the end the court held that “this is 
shady business but it cannot convert”  the suit against Heiden, who is a 
citizen of Illinois, into “a suit against a Floridian.”173 
 Most individuals may lack the financial means to keep multiple 
residences in different states, but as stated domicile is based on several 
factors, and intent is the focal point.174 Even if individuals like the 
Plaintiffs vote and pay taxes in Puerto Rico, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin 
Islands they can still prove that their domicile is Illinois.175 They must 
establish that they never intended to change their domicile and they 
have an intent to return. The UOCAVA does not require an intent to 
return but this will be necessary in order to argue that they have a 
fundamental right to vote. These facts will be specific to each plaintiff. 
This article does not attempt to establish exactly how a person can 
reside in a U.S. territory and be a State citizen, but rather provide that 
if they are able to do so they have a fundamental right to vote. 
 If a plaintiff is able to establish state citizenship then the 
UOCAVA would permit Illinois citizens residing in certain territories 
the right to vote, but deny that right to the those residing in Puerto 
Rico, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin Islands. This is a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause that would be subject to strict scrutiny because the 
plaintiffs would be an Illinois Citizens with the fundamental right to 
vote. And this arbitrary distinction would almost certainly fail a strict 
scrutiny analysis.  
                                                 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 731. 
173 Id. 
174 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999). 
175 See Galva Foundry Co., 924 F.2d at 730. 
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 Although the concept of domicile is generally used in the context 
of diversity jurisdiction the Supreme Court has also used domicile 
when considering voting rights cases.176 As well, the point of a 
diversity jurisdiction inquiry is determining which state an individual 
belongs to, and that would be the same determination for considering 
if a person has a fundamental right to vote as a State Citizen.177  
 Since the Plaintiffs reside in Puerto Rico, the fact that they are not 
permitted to vote in federal elections is because Puerto Rico does not 
have any rights under the Constitution to participate in federal 
elections since it is not a state.178 But an Illinois citizen would not be 
participating in elections on behalf of Puerto Rico, they would be 
participating in federal elections based on their fundamental right as an 
Illinois Citizens. This issue must be seen on its face not analyzed 
based on decisions that present constitutionally different issues.179 The 
Plaintiffs in Segovia are qualified voters as Illinois citizens. The 
UOCAVA protects the fundamental right to vote for Illinois Citizens 
who reside in the American Samoa but does not equally protect that 
right for Illinois citizens residing in Puerto Rico. The reason for their 
exclusion is not justified by a “narrowly tailored” compelling 
government interest.180 The UOCAVA may have been enacted before 
there was a change in the status of certain U.S. territories but these 
changes have resulted in an unconstitutional enforcement.181 Therefor 
the UOCAVA would not satisfy the strict scrutiny test as its 
                                                 
176 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 508. 
 177 I am aware that in the future there may be issues with domicile for 
jurisdiction and domicile for voting. But diversity jurisdiction has evolved to mainly 
determine whether an individual purposefully availed themselves in the state. See J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 889 (2011). 
178 See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010). 
179 See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018). 
180 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). 
 181 The Seventh Circuit held that when UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE were 
passed the Northern Marianas was a "Trust Territory” with less integration than 
other U.S. territories, but now the Northern Marianas further resemble other US 
territories and even have a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives. See 
Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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enforcement permits the unconstitutional infringement of the Illinois 
Citizens fundamental voting rights.  
 
Segovia: The Distinction Between American Territories is Not 
Rational 
 
 The third issue the Segovia court considered was whether Illinois 
MOVE was rational. The court erred in its rational basis analysis of 
Illinois MOVE by placing more significance on potential political 
ramifications opposed to the actual rationality of the statute. The court 
in Segovia held that the rationality for Illinois MOVE is arbitrary now 
but was not when it was enacted nearly 40 years ago.182  
 The court reasoned that “while the distinction among United 
States territories may seem strange to an observer today, it made more 
sense when Illinois enacted the challenged definition.”183 The court 
then discussed that when Illinois’ MOVE was enacted the distinction 
that is now arbitrary was logical.184 The court held that it is irrelevant 
if the distinction between the Northern Marianas/American Samoa and 
other U.S. territories is arbitrary because Illinois defines living in the 
other territories as residing within the United States.185 The court 
reasoned that if it were to hold the statute unconstitutional residents of 
the Northern Mariana Islands would lose their voting rights, and some 
Puerto Rican residents would be able to vote while others would 
not.186 And therefore it is rational “for Illinois to retain the same 
definition it enacted nearly 40 years ago.”187  
 The court should not have based its decision on these 
ramifications. The rational basis test asks whether “there is a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
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governmental purpose.”188 The Supreme Court has already held that 
during a rational basis analysis "the constitutionality of a statute 
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be 
challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to 
exist."189 For instance, recently in Shelby County v. Holder, the 
Supreme Court held that the coverage formula of the 1965 Civil 
Rights Act was unconstitutional because of changed conditions.190 
Shelby County alleged that the coverage formula in the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 was facially unconstitutional.191 When the coverage 
formula was enacted it required jurisdictions that had “tests or devices 
as prerequisites to voting, and had lower voter registration and turnout, 
in the 1960s and early 1970s” to “obtain federal permission before 
enacting any law related to voting.”192 The Supreme Court previously 
upheld the coverage formula as rational in 1966 because it “was a 
legitimate response to the problem” of voter discrimination, and it was 
initially only meant to last for five years.193 However, it had been 
consistently reauthorized with no changes coverage to the coverage 
formula.194 But in 2013, the Court used a rational basis test when it 
held the coverage formula was unconstitutional because the legislation 
did not make sense “in light of current conditions.”195 The Court stated 
that the use of the formula was irrational because it was based on “40 
year old data,” and Congress needed to “draft another formula based 
current conditions.”196 
 Similarly, the rationality analysis of Illinois MOVE should be 
concerned with the current operation of the statute not just whether it 
                                                 
188 Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 423 (2001). 
189 U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). 
190 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 539. 
 193 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966). 
 194 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 529 (2013) (In 2006 Congress 
reauthorized the coverage formula for another 25 years). 
195 Id. at 553-556. 
196 Id. at 556-557. 
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was reasonable when enacted forty years ago. “There is no valid 
reason to insulate” Illinois MOVE “merely because it was previously 
enacted 40 years ago.”197 When Illinois MOVE was enacted the 
Northern Mariana Islands was a trust territory,198 a significant 
distinction from U.S. territories like Puerto Rico because trust 
territories are less intertwined with the U.S. government.199 But the 
Northern Mariana Islands has been a fully incorporated U.S. Territory 
since 1986.200 The changed status of the Northern Mariana Islands has 
resulted in Illinois MOVE violating Puerto Rican residents Equal 
Protection rights.201 And since this Equal Protection violation is based 
on changed conditions that led to the statute arbitrarily distinguishing 
between U.S. Territories the Seventh Circuit should have held that 
Illinois MOVE was irrational and unconstitutional.202 
 Also, the court should not have placed such significance on the 
potential ramifications that may have been accompanied by granting 
the Plaintiffs voting rights because the logic was circular.203 The 
Seventh Circuit held that holding the statute unconstitutional would 
take away the right to vote for American residents living in the 
American Samoa.204 This conclusion makes little sense in terms of an 
Equal Protection Claim. Simply put, the court held that it is rational 
for a statute to limit voting rights for U.S. citizens living in Puerto 
Rico because to overturn the statute would limit the voting rights of 
                                                 
197 See id. at 556.  
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U.S. citizens living in the American Samoa.205 Put differently, the 
court could not remedy the Equal Protection violation of U.S. citizens 
living in Puerto Rico because it may result in U.S. citizens living in 
the American Samoa not being equally protected. The proper 
conclusion to such a dilemma is that Illinois MOVE violates the Equal 
Protection Clause and the legislature needs to remedy the issue based 
on “current conditions.”206 
 
Consequences: The Potential Issues of Voting in Puerto Rico 
 
 The Segovia Court was correct that the potential ramifications 
from granting the Plaintiffs voting rights could lead to future issues 
regarding voting and Equal Protection Claims.207 Once some residents 
of Puerto Rico have voting rights and others do not, the door is opened 
for Puerto Rican citizens to bring an Equal Protection claim of their 
own. And Puerto Rico is in a sort of purgatory when it comes to rights 
in America: Puerto Rico wants the right to vote, but that right is 
reserved to states; Puerto Rico also wants to be a state but does not 
have any voting power to bring forth legislation in the U.S. 
Congress.208 For the longest time Puerto Rico wanted its cake and to 
eat it too: it did not want to be a state, but they still wanted voting 
rights.209 But those rights are reserved to states, and Puerto Rico is 
not.210 However, largely due to its 123-billion-dollar debt, Puerto Rico 
now would like become America’s 51st state.211 This is an issue 
President Trump and Congress have not considered, likely due to 
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Puerto Rico’s mounting monetary issues.212 There is also no clear 
procedure for how a U.S. territory becomes a state.213 And while 
Puerto Rico’s leaders have asked Congress for a process to statehood 
they have largely been ignored.214 So, if the Segovia court did grant 
the Plaintiff’s the right to vote, the potential issues that the court 
would have been faced with in the future would go far beyond just the 
scope of voting rights.  
 That said, the Seventh Circuit may not have considered all these 
issues when deciding Segovia, but the potential ramifications of the 
decision were much more substantial than simply granting voting 
rights. Yet, if a plaintiff is able to base their Equal Protection claim on 
the distinction that they are a citizen of a State it may prevent these 
issues because it would still uphold the general principle that the right 




 Voting in America is an integral part of our governmental system 
and it is a cherished right among citizens.216 The right to vote has seen 
a continuous expansion since the ratification of the Constitution.217 It 
is also a fundamental right for most U.S. citizens.218 Since the U.S. 
Constitution clearly places the right to vote in the hands of the states, a 
U.S. citizen only has a fundamental right to vote if they are also a 
citizen of a state.219 As a fundamental right any infringement of the 
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right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny.220 For those individuals who 
are not citizens of a state that right is not fundamental, and it may be 
subject to a less stringent standard of review when infringed upon.221 
And despite the phrasing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause, state citizenship is based on domicile opposed to residency.222 
Consequently, if U.S. Citizens residing in a Puerto Rico, Guam, or the 
U.S. Virgin Island would like to challenge the UOCAVA they should 
allege an Equal Protection violation based on the assertion that they 
are domiciled in Illinois, and as Illinois Citizens they have a 
fundamental right to vote.223 The argument that the UOCAVA does 
not equally protect the right to vote of non-resident U.S. citizens has 
been, and likely will continue to be struck down because only state 
citizens have a fundamental right to vote.224 The remedy may be 
finding a suitable plaintiff who can allege domicile within a state, and 
argue that as a State citizen they have a fundamental right to vote. And 
since legislation like the UOCAVA and Illinois Move arbitrarily grant 
the right to vote to an Illinois citizen living in the American Samoa it 
would likely not pass strict scrutiny.225 This could result in an 
improved statute that properly addresses American territories. And it 
would prevent courts from getting involved in the complicated 
business of Puerto Rico statehood and voting rights.226  
 
 
                                                 
220 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). 
221 See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010). 
222 See e.g., Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 649 (1878). 
 223 See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018); Igartúa v. 
United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010).  
 224 See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018); Igartúa v. 
United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010).  
225 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964); Segovia v. United 
States, 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018) 
226 See Campbell, supra, note 209. 
30
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/3
